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I. Introductory Remarks
A non-American lawyer must be cautious when expressing value judgments
about the legal scene in the U.S. Variations in the case law of the states can be
significant; the law can change suddenly-at times as a result of "political"
changes in the state judiciary-which a foreign observer may not be able to
follow let alone fully understand; and the different legal roles' that judges and
academics have to perform in the constant development of the law make it
dangerous for the latter to criticize the former. Yet despite these caveats, an
academic with a comparative training would like to express some reservations
about what appears to him as an absence of doctrinal clarity in some tort cases
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**This article is a written version of a presentation made to the law faculty of Southern Methodist
University on February 15, 1991. References to the rich case law and periodical literature have
deliberately been kept to a minimum. The paper mainly deals with attorney malpractice. In a sequel
I hope to discuss the confusing rules that govern survival and wrongful death actions. I am partic-
ularly grateful for useful discussions I have had with my colleagues Jim Henderson, the Frank B.
Ingersoll Professor of Law, and Robert Summers, the William G. McRoberts Research Professor in
Administration of the Law, during my brief teaching visit at the Cornell Law School during the spring
term of 1991. Neither of them, of course, bears any responsibility for the ideas put forward in the
text.
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that are often litigated before state courts and are invariably included in class
materials used by students at different stages of their legal education. In advo-
cating the need to pay greater attention to proper doctrinal analysis of these
problems, I have all along remained mindful of the practical implications of
such an exercise which I discuss later in this paper. However, as a teacher I am
also conscious of the need to analyze and teach law without underplaying or
ignoring the impact that the institutional, political, and social background can
have on the operation of legal rules. For me, advocating rigorous doctrinal
analysis is thus not an alternative to a policy-oriented exegesis of the law but a
necessary complement. 2
II. Attorney Liability Towards Third Parties
(Nonclients): Contract, Tort, or Nothing?
The subheading gives some idea of the rich variations of American case law.
In reality the situation is even more complicated. Some courts accept liability in
tort (provided certain criteria are satisfied); others declare that recovery can be
based on either contract or tort theory; others declare contractual theories "su-
perfluous" (for which read unnecessary); yet others use hybrid language which,
at best, can bring them in one of the above categories and, at worst, can be
regarded as sloppy; while a final group of courts, adhering to the traditional
notion of privity, deny recovery altogether. This text need not be cluttered with
the kind of exhaustive footnote references American (and German) lawyers so
admire. Suffice it to illustrate these categories with limited references and, from
these, examine which classification is preferable and why.
As has often been the case in the 1960s and 1970s, the law on this topic was
first shaped by Californian courts. Biakanja v. Irving3 had to decide whether a
nonlawyer notary public could be liable to a frustrated beneficiary for failing to
have the will properly attested. The decision of the Supreme Court of California
was to allow such an action and it did so by invoking tort doctrine. For this to
happen, however, the court has to
balanc[e] ... various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.4
2. In the context of comparative methodology, I have stressed the need for this duality in my
following works: I F. H. LAWSON & B. S. MARKESINIS, TORTIOUS LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL
HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW ch. 2 (1982); B. S. MARKESINIS & C. VON BAR,
RICHTERLICHE RECHTSPOLITIK IM HAFTUNGSRECHT (1981); Markesinis, Litigation-Mania in England,
Germany and the U.S.A.: Are We So Very Different?, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233 (1990).
3. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
4. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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In its subsequent decision in Lucas v. Hamm,5 involving a defective will drafted
by a qualified attorney, the Supreme Court of California purported to "restate"
[sic]6 the Biakanja test though, in reality, it "paraphrased" it-as one commen-
tator has put it7-by omitting all reference to the penultimate requirement (moral
blame). Whether this omission was deliberate (given the different factual context
of the two cases) or accidental is by no means obvious; indeed, subsequent
decisions do not seem to have paid much attention to the verbal variation of what
has become known as the "multi-criteria test."
Lucas v. Hamm, however, did not stop there. In line with a previously ex-
pressed (but not here referred to) line of reasoning first formulated by Justice
Cardozo, s the court in Lucas was also prepared to treat the third party as an
intended beneficiary of the contract between testator and attorney since he (the
third party) was the "end and aim" of the entire transaction (the drawing up of
the will). If Biakanja thus provides an illustration of tort theory of recovery,
Lucas provides an example of either tort or contract reasoning for achieving this
result.
While courts in other states inevitably followed suit, a restless California
Supreme Court was to muddy the waters further. A bare eight years later in its
decision in Heyer v. Flaig9 (yet another wills case) it would describe "this latter
[i.e., contractual] theory of recovery. . .[as] conceptually superfluous since the
crux of the action must lie in tort in any case."1 0l Justice Tobriner, delivering
the majority judgment, then added, "This reading of Lucas is reinforced by the
following language recited with approval in the case of Eads v. Marks (1952) 39
Cal.2d 807, 811, 249 P.2d 257, 260: 'It has been well established in this state
that if the cause of action arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the
contract, the action is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty growing
out of the contract it is ex delicto.' ""
It is submitted that on closer analysis the meaning of this statement is far from
obvious. At this stage, however, suffice it to say that Heyer represents an ex-
ample of the third possible stance that the courts can take on the topic under
consideration: If the attorney is to be held liable towards a third party, it can only
be in tort. Back to Biakanja but in a more categorical way!
Heyer, however, does not mark the end of the variations. Some courts, ob-
viously unsettled by these constant reformulations, have come down in favor of
contract or tort but using language that belongs to both and displays, at the very
5. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
6. Id. at 585, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
7. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 225 n.50 (1986).
8. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
9. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
10. Id. at 226, 449 P.2d at 164, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (emphasis added).
11. Id. (original emphasis).
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least, an aversion to terminological precision. The following quote, from the
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Pelham v. Griesheimer, I think,
makes my point:
While privily of contract has been abolished in many areas of tort law, the concern is still
that liability for negligence not extend to an unlimited and unknown number of potential
plaintiffs. In the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to his client must
remain paramount. In such cases the best approach is that the plaintiffs must allege and
prove facts demonstrating that they are in the nature of third-parry intended beneficiaries of
the relationship between the client and the attorney in order to recover in tort.... By this
we mean that to establish a duty owed by the defendant attorney to the nonclient the
nonclient must allege and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient third
party was the primary or direct purpose of the transaction or relationship. 12
The fifth and last position towards our problem can be found in states like
Texas where the (otherwise pro-plaintiff) courts adhere to the traditional privity
rule and deny all liability towards third parties. The latest decision I am aware of
is Dickey v. Jansen.13 It was decided on April 9, 1987, by the Houston (1st
District) Court of Appeals and boldly asserts that "Texas law does not recognize
a negligence cause of action in these circumstances, on the theory that an attor-
ney owes a duty only to those parties in privity of contract with him. Berry v.
Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C., 717 S.W.2d 716, 718. .. . A number of
points arise from the majority and dissenting judgment (delivered by Chief
Justice Evans) if read together.
First, the majority decided the case on negligence theory alone since the
"appellants [third party] did not plead a theory of third party beneficiary."1 5 If
that is true, then the citing of Berry v. Dodson as authority for nonliability in
negligence is not entirely satisfactory. For the facts in Berry, as the dissenting
Chief Justice pointed out, were "different . . . [since] the allegation [in Berry]
was not that the testator's attorney had been guilty of negligent draftsmanship,
but that he had not . . . prepared [the will at all] for execution before the testator
died." 16 This, in other words, was arguably a case of nonfeasance, not misfea-
sance, and the reluctance to impose liability for omissions in tort is as hallowed
in the common law as it is well-known. ' 7
Secondly, the dissent was willing to consider contractual recovery on the
ground that "the appellants alleged the essential elements of a third-party ben-
eficiary action against the appellees."' 8 In doing so, however, it cited cases
12. 92 111. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (1982) (emphasis added).
13. 731 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. Id. at 582.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 584.
17. But see the New Zealand case of Gartside v. Sheffield, Young & Ellis, [1983] N.Z.L.R. 37.
German courts have, in such cases of inaction, accepted liability, but the theory of recovery is
contractual and, therefore, the result is more understandable. See BGH, [1965] NJW 1955; [1966]
JZ 141, with a note by Professor W. Lorenz.
18. Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987).
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which are not entirely supportive of its view. Thus the dissent's reference to both
Biakanja and Lucas to buttress its contractual theory is misleading for, as we
have already noted, only the second case recognized a contractual cause of
action; and even this is now, as a result of Heyer, in doubt.
Thirdly, notwithstanding the above, could the intended beneficiary doctrine be
applied in Texas? The subsequent decision of the Texas appellate court in Hel-
lenic Investment, Inc. v. Krogert9 would suggest an affirmative answer. For
Hellenic-which was not a wills case-held that for a third party to be able to
invoke the intended beneficiary doctrine it would have to show that "it was not
a party to the contract [in the wills cases between the testator and the attorney],
that the contract was made for its direct benefit [which in the wills cases it is],
and that the contracting parties intended that it so benefit.'2° These require-
ments, as indicated in the brackets, are fully satisfied in the wills cases and the
only doubt one has with the quote, which broadly follows the Restatement
terminology, 2 1 is the use of the plural in the word parties. Since this slip has
appeared in a number of wills cases it should, it is submitted, be corrected and
the clarification made that in contracts in favor of third parties the intention to
confer a benefit is the intention of the promisee (testator) and not of the promisor
(attorney) though, of course, the latter must know to whom he must render his
contractual performance. 22
III. Contract or Tort-Does It Matter?
Much of the above may strike some as nit-picking; but the designation of the
action as contractual or tortious becomes essential, especially in the light of the
categorical statements in Heyer v. Flaig that the contractual action is "superflu-
ous" and that "the crux of the action must lie in tort." The submission of this
paper is that it is necessary to decide on the proper characterization of the cause
of action for this may affect the following rules.23
A. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The tort and contract measure of damages may differ even though academics
and judges have, in some instances, proposed a greater approximation of the
19. 766 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
20. Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979).
22. It is submitted that Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961), once again gets this point
right. Even within the same state, courts are sometimes confused. Thus, in Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d
744, 751 (Pa. 1983), the court seems to be stating that the promisor must have had the requisite intention,
while in the earlier (nonwills) case of Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 70 A..2d 828 (Pa. 1950), the
court talks of both promisor and promisee intending to benefit the third party. Finally, in Flaherty v.
Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985), the court (correctly) refers to the promisee's intentions.
23. This section draws on the comparative account I have given in B. S. MARKESINIS, THE
GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 233-39 (2d ed 1990), and my case note, Markesinis, Eternal and Trouble-
some Triangles, 106 LAW Q. REv. 556-61 (1990).
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rules. 24 The classical contractual approach would favor the award of full expec-
tation damages to the plaintiff/third party. In the U.S.A., a tort action might
justify an additional claim for punitive damages. This did, in fact, occur in
Heyer.
B. LIABILITY FOR OMISSIONS
Traditional tort theory would deny liability where the defendant had remained
inactive rather than had acted badly (unless, of course, one were able to rechar-
acterize the inactivity as a wrongful act which in many cases one can do without
too much difficulty). A contractual solution could, by contrast, make the defen-
dant liable for both misfeasance and nonfeasance. In other jurisdictions courts
have held attorneys liable for failure to draw up in a timely fashion their clients'
wills. Thus, Germany has done this contractually; New Zealand and The Neth-
erlands have achieved the result through tort.25 The Dutch result is not so
surprising since the civil law systems are more inclined than the common law to
impose liability for omissions. The New Zealand case on the other hand is
"unorthodox" by common law standards; and it is also irreconcilable with cases
like Berry v. Dodson. 26
C. THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF CARE THAT MUST
BE ATTAINED BY THE DEFENDANT
There has been some concern about this point in both England and the U.S.A.
German law, on the other hand, proceeding on contract theory, has not experi-
enced this difficulty; and German writers, considering a hypothetical (for them)
tort action have had no difficulty in saying that the tort standard of care should
be determined by the contract. The passage from Justice Tobriner's judgment in
Heyer v. Flaig quoted above2 7 may also be taken to support this view.
D. THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION
Both the length and the starting point (e.g., breach of contract versus occur-
rence of the damage) may differ in tort and contract. If this were so, it would be
impracticable to subject one relationship (plaintiff-attorney) to one set of rules
and the other relationship (testator-attorney) to a different set of rules. The point
is, again, of practical significance. Thus, Pennsylvania courts have, for example,
24. In England a controversial proposal has been made by Lord Denning in H. Parsons (Live-
stock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] Q.B. 791.
25. BGH, [19651 NJW 1955; [1966] JZ 141; Hof Amsterdam [1985] N.J. 40. In Schwartz,
Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 37, 42 (1986), the author provides a hypothetical example involving inaction in the
context of drafting a will and suggests that the solution should lie in contract, not tort.
26. 717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd by agr.).
27. 70 Cal. 2d 233, 449 P.2d 101, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
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agonized as to whether the applicable statute of limitations should be determined
by the nature of the cause of action or other criteria;2 8 and the result is a
difference between two, four, or six years of limitation period.
E. JURISDICTION INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL
The choice-orientated approach adopted by conflicts rules in cases of contract
seems more appropriate in these types of cases than the locus of the accident tort
approach. In any event, it would be odd (if not inconvenient) if the dispute
between plaintiff/defendant (third party-attorney in the cases under consider-
ation) were subject to one rule and the relationship between attorney/testator
were governed by a different law. We could, again, allow the underlying con-
tractual relationship to influence the tort action (as Justice Tobriner implied in
Heyer); but why not opt more openly whenever we can for the more straight-
forward contractual reasoning?
F. EXEMPTION CLAUSEs/DEFENSES
It has never been in doubt, both in the civil law and those common law systems
that recognize contracts in favor of third parties, that the promisor can oppose
against the third party the defenses and other exemption clauses that he may have
as a result of his contract with the promisee. I am not aware of this point ever
having been raised in the attorney malpractice cases though Lord Justice Goff (as
he then was) alluded to it in an obiter dictum29 giving the hypothetical example
of an attorney agreeing to draft a will in an emergency and without access to his
law books. In such a case, if the attorney had limited his liability towards his
client, he ought to enjoy the same protection as against a third party. One can
achieve this result by saying, yet again, that the tortious action is shaped by the
underlying contract (as Tobriner's dicta in Heyer might suggest, though remem-
ber he talks of the crux of the action lying in tort), or by openly opting for the
contractual option and saying that the attorney (promisor) can invoke against the
third party the defenses he has against the promisee (testator). Does it matter
in practice which way this result is achieved? I think it does, not least because
the contractual way concentrates one's mind on the various points I have raised
in this section. The contractual approach has the further advantage of making it
clear that the exemption clause that matters is the one in the contract between
promisor and promisee. This point becomes crucial in another triangular context
involving two sets of contracts between site owners (0), contractors (C), and
28. Compare Moore v. McComsey, 459 A.2d 841, 844 (Pa. 1983), and Guy v. Liederbach, 459
A.2d 744, 752-53 (Pa. 1983), with Gatley v. Lewis, quoted by Bogutz & Albert, A Survey of the
Developing Pennsylvania Law of Attorney Malpractice, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1237, 1258 (1990), where
further references are available.
29. Leigh & Sillavan Ltd. v. The Aliakmon Shipping Co. (The Aliakmon), [1985] Q.B. 350,
397-98.
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subcontractors (SC). 30 For reasons of space, two simple factual situations will be
considered, but little ingenuity is required to envisage more complicated vari-
ants. Though the cases considered in the following are English, they represent
factual variations on the J'Aire theme so the points raised here could be of
relevance to American lawyers.
In my first example, the SC's fault gives rise to remedial expenditure costing,
say, $1,000 to O. This, essentially, was the situation in the English case of South
Water Authority v. Carey.3 1 In the second situation, the SC's fault causes damage
to O's existing property, which, again for argument's sake, will cost him $1,000
to repair. In the more recent English case of Norwich City Council v. Harvey
32
the Court of Appeal, partly through silence and partly as a result of frequent
references to Carey,33 gave the impression that the two situations were identical.
They were not. For the former involved pure economic loss-increasingly viewed
with disapproval by conservatively (especially in England) inclined courts-
whereas the latter is concerned with property damage, an area of tort law which
has, traditionally, been widely compensated, especially in American law.
Norwich, as is typical of such cases, not only involved the question of liability
in principle of SC to 0 but also SC's potential avoidance of liability because of
an exemption clause to be found in the contract between 0 and C. The first point
one can make in passing (without going into details as to how exemption clauses
theoretically affect the defendant's position) is that Carey could be read as
holding that there was a prima facie duty of care but that the area of risk the
plaintiff had chosen to accept was defined by the contract.34 In Norwich, on the
other hand, the phraseology of the court is not all that clear. Garland J., at first
instance, apparently adopted the Carey approach 35 whereas there are passages in
the Court of Appeal's judgment36 which suggest that, because of the exemption
clause, no duty arose in the first place. 37 This, however, is not the crucial point
about the effect of the exemption clauses in the cases under review. The real
30. The contractor cases, introduced at this stage of the discussion, have many things in common
with the attorney cases. They both involve triangular relations; they both (invariably) involve pure
economic loss; and in both the economic loss will typically affect a limited or, at any rate, definable
set of persons and thus the floodgates argument, which is invoked to defeat economic loss claims, is
of no use here. This similarity between these two cases has been recognized by the courts which have
used these decisions as having precedential value. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,
598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). On the other hand, one must also remember that the
attorney-client relationship has its own characteristic features; and in the building cases one is faced,
as already stated, with two contracts (0 and C, and C and SC), whereas in the attorney cases there is
one contract only between testator and attorney. Thus, one must not press the analogy too far,
31. [1985] 2 All E.R. 1077.
32. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828.
33. Which was described as containing an "extremely" helpful judgment. Id. at 838.
34. [1985] 2 All E.R. 1077, 1078 headnote.
35. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828, 831.
36. Id.
37. The headnote on page 828, admittedly not part of the judgment, also suggests that this
interpretation is plausible. Id. at 828.
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point is which exemption clause should have the above effects? This is a crucial
point because in these triangular situations under consideration we are faced with
two contracts-one between 0 and C (henceforth contract 1) and one between C
and SC (contract 2). Both may contain exemption clauses which may be identical
(Norwich) or different (as was the case with the third but not the other defendants
in Carey). As stated, in Norwich the Court of Appeal took the view that because
of the exemption clause in contract 1, SC was not liable. Crucial to this result
was Lord Keith's observation in Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir
Lindsay Parkinson & Co., Ltd. that "in determining whether or not a duty of care
of particular scope was incumbent upon a defendant it is material to take into
consideration whether it is just and reasonable that it should be so." 38 So was
the result just and reasonable? How are we to judge this question, save by
looking at the usual extracts that our judges quote in extenso over and over again
in the process of producing longer than necessary judgments? In actual fact we
have two pointers: (1) a clear statement 39 that, in essence, all parties were
involved (commercially) in the same transaction and knew where they stood; and
(2) one tantalizing but incomplete hint at the very end of the judgment about
"the insurance position and subrogation rights." 40 Let us look at these points in
reverse order.
The decision to bar O's rights in effect amounts to a decision to bar his
insurer's subrogation rights. Should that consideration be relevant to the under-
lying decision to bar O's rights? For those (mainly British academics) who
condemn insurers for wishing to eat their cake and have it (i.e., collect premiums
to cover risks and exercise subrogation rights when the risk is realized), anything
that helps cut down on these rights may appear to be fair and reasonable. Even
if insurers' rights are clearly established in this regard, and cannot be taken away
openly, they can, it seems, be neutralized obliquely. The Norwich court may have
been doing just that by denying that 0 was owed a duty of care. If the court was,
in fact, doing this it may have been convinced that such a ruling promoted an
economic efficiency rule: that losses such as these are best channelled through
first-party insurance which avoids litigation. This, in effect, is one of the argu-
ments used in England extrajudicially to support the Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd.
v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) decision;4 1 and it might be arguable here, too.
Denying subrogation rights would, according to the same school of thought, also
avoid the (potential) wastefulness of both fire insurance (taken out by 0) and
liability insurance (probably taken out by SC) on the same segment of risk. The
38. [1985] C.A. 210, 241 (emphasis added).
39. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828, 837.
40. Id. at 838.
41. [1973] Q.B. 27. For American equivalents, see Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp.,
53 A.D.2d 150, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1976); Beck v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 118, 385
N.Y.S.2d 956 (Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1027, 369 N.E.2d 10, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1977).
But cf. New Zealand Forest Prod. Ltd. v. Attorney Gen., I N.Z.L.R. 14 (1986).
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thinking behind Kerr L.J.'s judgment in Rowlands (Mark) Ltd. v. Berni Inns
Ltd.42 may thus also be applicable in these network contract cases encouraging
43the courts to look at the global pattern of risk allocation on construction sites.
Having suggested such a way of approaching these cases may I add that there
is no evidence in the judgments to suggest that this was the judges' main aim.
Moreover, such an analysis may be flawed since it appears to beg, but not
answer, the underlying question of barring O's rights. For focusing on O's
insurer's right to subrogation overlooks the fact that barring 0 relieves SC's
insurer's obligation to indemnify SC. When both sides of the insurance picture
are considered, the issue becomes which insurance pool-O's or SC's-should
bear the loss, which simply raises anew the issue of whether 0 should win or be
barred. The point about favoring first-party over third-party insurance may be
proving too much if it argues against liability in every instance. Finally, the
argument that duplication in insurance coverage should be avoided overlooks the
fact that the subrogation clause in O's insurance contract will avoid duplication
of coverage. Both 0 and SC will, presumably, wish to carry their own insurance
to cover potential losses in many other contexts than the one here being consid-
ered. It follows that, according to this way of thinking, "insurance and subro-
gation rights" may not inform decisively the analysis of who should, as between
0 and SC, prevail. Happily, for present purposes, this issue need not be settled
here. What must be stressed, however, is a different point, namely that if the
ingredients for discovering a duty of care are, essentially, devices for introducing
into the legal syllogism policy considerations, then these considerations should
be discussed openly so that lawyers (teacher and practitioners alike) could con-
tribute meaningfully to the debate.
But what about the first explanation of the Norwich conclusion? In colloquial
terms they were all in the same boat, liable in the same way through a network
of interlocking clauses. In the court's view SC was let off the hook thanks to a
clause in contract 1.
Norwich did this largely by following Carey; and the latter case allowed the
third defendant (SC) to involve the clause in contract 1 by relying on some dicta
of Lord Roskill's in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co.,44 apparently interpreting
the exclusion clause situation in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd.4 5 Now, if all this reasoning can, indeed, be traced back to Hedley Byrne it
would appear to be wrong. For if we see Hedley Byrne in triangular terms, the
plaintiff in that case stands for 0 in Norwich, Bank A (the plaintiff's bank) stands
42. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 437.
43. For further references on this, see M. A. CLARKE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS I-IA,
31-5D (1989).
44. [1983] 1 A.C. 520, 546-47.
45. [1964] A.C. 465. Lord Roskill's key words were: "the relevant exclusion clause in the main
[sic] contract." Hedley Byrne was a case involving the potential liability of accountants towards third
parties.
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for C, and Bank B (the advising bank/defendant) stands for SC, we then note that
the all-important exemption clause is that found in contract 2 (or, in the Hedley
Byrne situation, in the relationship between A and B). The same is mutatis
mutandis true of other triangular cases potentially involving exemption clauses
such as Biakanja or Lucas (where the advising attorney is in the position of SC
and the testator in that of C though here, of course, we are faced with only one
contract). In all these cases the legally relevant clause is and should be that found
in contract 2, not contract 1. All this may sound confusing; and it is confusing
since triangular relationships in law (as in married life) are just that. Confusing
and troublesome until, that is, one takes the trouble to analyze them carefully and
see how best one can untangle the mess.
My reading of these cases is that they are really contract cases solved through
tort-in England because of the strict doctrine of privity, in the U.S.A. because
the advantages of the contractual approach have not seriously been considered;
indeed, worse still, in the leading case of J'Aire the contractual cause of action
was, according to the plaintiff's lawyer, abandoned at the Supreme Court level
inter alia on the (unbelievable) grounds that "contracts were never [his] strong
point in Law School" !46 So why not treat, where the facts allow it, the plaintiff
(0) as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between C and SC? Deciding this
on the intended beneficiary criteria should be clearer than applying the vaguer
tort of negligence or saying that though the action is tortious it is shaped by the
underlying contracts that may exist. In my solution, the plaintiff would get his
action where, on occasion, tort doctrine has denied it to him.47 The
defendant-SC in the building cases-would only be liable to the extent that he
had agreed in his contract (contract 2) with his co-contractor to be liable. This
would not, necessarily, have been fatal in the Norwich case for the court could
have argued that the clause in contract 1 had de facto if not de iure become a
clause of contract 2. But is this mere theoretical pedantry? I do not think it is,
since it helps explain why the SC in Norwich can be absolved whereas the third
defendant/SC in Carey, who had originally rejected the C's clause, should not.
Thus, to me at least, it may be "transparently unfair" to deny the Norwich
defendant the right to invoke the protection of the clause in contract 1; but this
is by no means obvious in the case of the Carey defendant who was allowed to
blow hot and cold over the (presumably) differing clauses in contracts 1 and 2.
My contractual solution might also be fairer to the SC in the case of bank-
ruptcy of C-something which must often happen and tempt 0 to sue SC instead
of the more obvious co-contractor/C. For if SC is liable in contract (as I suggest)
and not in tort, and he has already paid C, he would not be liable to pay again if sued,
46. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 43. For American building cases solved through contract,
see Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 336 A.2d 211 (Del. 1975); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Jardel Co., 421 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1970); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho
462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). For further comments, see 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 315, 331-32 (1971).
47. See Leigh & Sillavan, Ltd. v. The Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1985] Q.B. 350.
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by 0. (Unless, of course, O's loss was greater than C's, in which case he would have
to pay the difference. This complication, however, has not been considered in this
short paper.) All this could be achieved if the action were contractual and accepted
doctrine was applied, making it clear that the promisor (SC) is liable to the third
party (0) in precisely the same way as he is liable to the promisee (C).
The contractual solution would bring the same advantages to the first triangular
relationship discussed in this paper, namely that of testator, attorney, and third-
party beneficiary. Indeed, it might even be more appropriate here given the special
nature of the attorney-client relationship and the need to have a workable rule to
determine the bounds of liability towards nonclient/third parties. For the tort
multicriteria test of Biakanja seems and remains notoriously vague even though
a multitude of decisions by various courts have since purported to apply it. Nor
is this surprising since Biakanja never decided whether the stated factors must be
cumulatively or individually satisfied; nor did it express a view as to whether one
of them might, in fact, have a greater normative value over the others.
Finally, though my preferred test is more restrictive than the tort approach, it
should not, necessarily, be taken to limit attorney liability towards third-party
beneficiaries of a will. For, on occasion, the promisee must be taken to intend to
benefit the third party and derive himself some advantages from the proposed
transaction. Thus, an attorney who negligently perfects an adoption could be
held liable both towards the "adopting" parents (who employed the attorney to
this end) and towards the adoptee who, because of the attorney's negligence
finds himself deprived of his inheritance rights vis-A-vis his "adopting" parents.
Metzker v. Slocum, 48 applying tort reasoning, held the adoptee's loss in a situ-
ation analogous but not identical to my hypothetical case to be unforeseeable and
thus denied him recovery; but the result seems as unfair as its reasoning is
strained and it is, therefore, submitted that my preferred contractual reasoning
could in this case help achieve a more equitable result.
IV. Concluding Observations
At the end of this presentation may I make two points by way of concluding
remarks?
First, I have in this paper been talking of intended beneficiaries and contracts
in favor of third parties. The factual situations to which I have been applying
these terms are not, really, typical examples of contracts in favor of third parties.
For what the plaintiffs are seeking in these cases is not to make the defendants
perform their primary obligation (to draw up the will or to do the subcontracting
work) but to make them liable for damages for bad performance of the main (or
subsidiary) obligations and the resulting economic loss. The Germans do not
refer to these contracts as contracts in favor of third parties but as contracts with
protective effects vis-A-vis third parties. The reason why this distinction is made
48. 272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975).
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in German law is particular to that system and need not concern us here. But the
central idea strikes me as a good one, namely that while the contractual debt-
or/defendant should in certain circumstances be liable towards noncontracting
parties he should not be more extensively liable towards them than he is vis-A-vis
his co-contracting party. Whether you do this through a tort action which is
shaped by the underlying contract or through contract may, at the end of the day,
be treated as one of semantics. What, however, is important is to give the third
party a remedy while not overexposing the defendant. My preferred contractual
approach reveals the need for such a compromise and makes the means for
achieving it more evident.
My second observation is in the form of a question: Why has the need for such
a compromise gone unnoticed in the U.S.A.? And why have these cases received
such inadequate theoretical consideration? During eleven years of teaching in
leading American law schools, questions such as the above, when asked, have
produced three answers. From the most cynically minded the reply was that it was
expecting too much from state judges (who decide the bulk of these cases); from
the practically orientated the response has been that neither judges nor practi-
tioners have sufficient time to prepare and reflect on these problems; finally, the
jurisprudentially inclined of my colleagues have come up with the familiar ex-
planation that it is not the role of judges-at any rate American judges-to attempt
the doctrinal analysis of the issues put before them. I would not wish to be con-
vinced as to the accuracy of the first explanation; I have much sympathy for the
second but bemoan the fact that so many modern lawyers seem to devote to
reflection the inverse amount of time than they do to collating the ever-increasing
legal material that modern technology puts at their disposal; and if the third reason
is the more respectable one, then I feel it is the duty of academics to supply the
theoretical underpinnings for what judges do or ought to do .49 For academics can
study law as a science, with greater detachment and under less time pressure than
their practicing colleagues. They can also test the validity of their solutions against
a broader and more comprehensive background than that offered by a particular
dispute. The advantages of such a study must then constantly be related to and
combined with the more focused work of judges. Academics and judges must,
therefore, work even closer than they have done so far. For, as an experienced
English judge (who can lay equal claim to being considered a learned jurist) once
wrote, "jurists are pilgrims with us [judges] on the endless road to unattainable
perfection; and we have it on the excellent authority of Geoffrey Chaucer that
conversations among pilgrims can be most rewarding." 50
49. And, in fact, academics have supplied these underpinnings in the context of the factual
situations discussed above. Thus, to the work of Professor Schwartz, quoted supra note 25, add
Reynolds, Tort Actions in Contractual Situations, 11 N.Z.U.L. REv. 215 (1985). For a thoughtful
discussion of Texas case law on the boundaries of contract and tort, see William Powers, Jr. &
Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the "Economic Loss," scheduled for publica-
tion in the November 1991 issue of "lkx. TtCH L. REV.
50. Spilada Maritime Corp. v. Causulex Ltd., [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, 863 (Goff, L.J.).
WINTER 1991

